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Abstract
To improve the performance of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, high speed, low dark
count single photon detectors (or low noise homodyne detectors) are required. However, in prac-
tice, a fast detector is usually noisy. Here, we propose a “dual detectors” method to improve the
performance of a practical QKD system with realistic detectors: the legitimate receiver randomly
uses either a fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming
quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to bound eaves-
dropper’s information, while the measurement results from the fast detector are used to generate
secure key. We apply this idea to various QKD protocols. Simulation results demonstrate signifi-
cant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated
coherent states (GMCS) protocol; while for decoy-state BB84 protocol with weak coherent source,
the improvement is moderate. We also discuss various practical issues in implementing the “dual
detectors” scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
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I. INTRODUCTION
One important practical application of quantum information is quantum key distribution
(QKD), whose unconditional security is based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechan-
ics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. In principle, any eavesdropping attempts by a third party (Eve)
will unavoidably introduce quantum bit errors. So, it is possible for the legitimate users
(Alice and Bob) to upper bound the amount of information acquired by the eavesdropper
given system parameters and the measured quantum bit error rate (QBER). If the QBER is
not too high and the transmission efficiency is not too low, Alice and Bob can then distill a
final secure key by performing error correction (to correct errors due to imperfections in the
QKD system and errors due to eavesdropping) and privacy amplification (to remove Eve’s
information on the final key).
A practical QKD system has imperfections, which will contribute to QBER even in the
absence of Eve. If Alice and Bob cannot distinguish the intrinsic QBER due to imperfections
from the one induced by Eve, in order to guarantee the unconditional security, they have to
assume that all errors originate from eavesdropping. Under this assumption, the intrinsic
QBER will increase the costs for both error correction and privacy amplification. On the
other hand, if Alice and Bob do have a way to distinguish the intrinsic QBER from the one
due to eavesdropping, then the cost for the privacy amplification can be reduced [9].
One important error source in a practical QKD system is the noise of the receiver’s
detector, for example, the dark count probability of a single photon detector (SPD) or the
“excess noise” of a homodyne detector. As the distance between Alice and Bob increases
(which is equivalent to a higher channel loss), the contribution to QBER from detector’s
noise becomes more significant. When the QBER is over some threshold, no secure key
can be generated. The maximum secure distance of a QKD system is thus limited by the
detector’s noise. On the other hand, the secure key rate is proportional to the operating rate
of the QKD system, which is mainly determined by the speed of the detector. In brief, an
ideal detector should be fast and noiseless. Unfortunately, in practice, high speed detectors
are usually noisy.
In classical metrology, there are many elegant methods to combat various noises asso-
ciated with the measurement devices. It is natural to ask this question: can we introduce
classical “calibration” processes into a QKD system to deal with various noises associated
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with its intrinsic imperfections? An intuitive idea is as follow: the receiver, Bob, adds a high
speed optical switch at the entrance of his device. He uses this switch to randomly block
some input signals. The measurement results with no input signal can be used to estimate
the intrinsic noise of the detector. Alice and Bob can further estimate among the total
QBER (measured when Bob’s switch is open), how much is contributed by this intrinsic
detector noise. The QBER caused by the intrinsic detector noise does not contribute to
Eve’s information, only the QBER above it does. Since Alice and Bob can bound Eve’s
information more tightly, the cost for privacy amplification will be lowered. We remark
that the cost for error correction remains the same, because whether the error is caused by
eavesdropping or by the intrinsic noise, Alice and Bob will treat them equally during an
error correction process.
Note that there is an implicit assumption in the above argument: that Eve cannot control
the intrinsic noise of the detector, or at most, she can increase but not decrease it. If Eve can
decrease the detector noise when the switch is ON, the above argument is not valid because
Bob cannot use the detector noise measured with switch OFF to estimate the detector
noise with switch ON. Unfortunately, this assumption is not straightforward to justify. The
first rule in quantum cryptography is: to guarantee unconditional secure, one should make
assumptions that are most favorable to Eve. In this case, we allow Eve to fully control the
noise of Bob’s detectors, and thus the above intuitive idea does not work.
Here we propose a “dual detectors” method to improve the performance of a QKD system
based on realistic detectors. The basic idea is quite simple: Bob has two detectors, one is
fast but noisy, while the other one is quiet but slow. For each incoming quantum signal,
Bob randomly chooses to use either the fast detector (with a high probability) or the slow
detector (with a low probability) to do the measurement. During the classical data post-
processing stage, Alice and Bob use the QBER measured by the slow (quiet) detector to
bound Eve’s information, and they use the raw key bits from the fast detector to produce a
secure key. Since Eve cannot predict which detector Bob will choose for each individual bit,
her attack is independent on which detector is used. So, Alice and Bob can apply the bound
(about Eve’s information) acquired from the low-noise detector to the raw key acquired from
the fast (but noisy) detector. By using a tighter bound on Eve’s information, the cost for
privacy amplification will be reduced. Intuitively, our proposal will improve the performance
of practical QKD setups.
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In this paper, we apply the “dual detectors” idea into three different protocols: namely,
the BB84 protocol with perfect single photon source [2](Section II), the decoy state BB84
protocol with weak coherent source [10, 11, 12, 13](Section III), and the Gaussian-modulated
coherent states (GMCS) protocol [5] (Section IV). Our simulation results confirmed the in-
tuitive prediction of performance, demonstrating significant improvements in both BB84
protocol with an ideal single photon source and GMCS protocol; while for decoy-state BB84
protocol with a weak coherent state source, the improvement is moderate. In Section V, we
discuss some practical issues in the implementation of the “dual detectors” idea, including
the loss introduced by the optical switch, the distribution of the signals between two detec-
tors, the dispersion of a long fiber and the security of a practical setup. Finally, in Section
VI, we end this paper with a brief discussion on the security of a practical QKD system.
II. SINGLE PHOTON BB84 QKD WITH DUAL DETECTORS
The most well known and mature QKD protocol is BB84 protocol [2]. There have been
a lot of research activities in building a practical single photon source [14]. In this section,
we assume that an ideal single photon source is employed. In this case, the secure key rate
is given by [8]
R =
1
2
rQ1[1− f(e1)H2(e1)−H2(e1)]. (1)
Here the factor 1/2 is due to half of the time, Alice and Bob use different bases (if one uses
the efficient BB84 protocol [15], this factors is one). r is the pulse repetition rate of the
QKD system. Q1 is the overall gain (taking into account of channel loss, optical loss inside
Bob and the detection efficiency of SPD), which is defined as the ratio of Bob’s detection
events to the total signal pulses sent by Alice. e1 is the QBER. f(x) is the bidirectional
error correction efficiency, and H2(x) is the binary entropy function, given by
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x). (2)
Note that in Eq.(1), the term f(e1)H2(e1) is the cost for error correction, while the term
H2(e1) is the cost for privacy amplification. With “dual detectors” method, Alice and Bob
use a “quiet” SPD (which yields a lower QBER at a long distance) to give a tighter bound
on Eve’s information H2(e1). This tighter bound can be used to lower the cost of privacy
amplification when Alice/Bob use a “noisier” (but faster) SPD to generate the secure key.
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Note the “dual detectors” method cannot be simply explained as using the quiet detector
to estimate the dark count of the noisy detector. It should be understood as using the quiet
detector to bound Eve’s information more tightly. For each pulse from Alice, right beyond
Bob’s optical switch (for randomly choosing detector), Eve’s potential information, I
(0)
Eve, is
independent on which detector Bob will choose to do the measurement. We can imagine
Bob’s two detectors as two independent QKD systems. Either of them can upper bound
Eve’s information properly. This means the two bounds (on Eve’s information) acquired
from the two detectors satisfy: I
(1)
Eve ≥ I
(0)
Eve, and I
(2)
Eve ≥ I
(0)
Eve. So, Bob can use either of I
(1)
Eve
(which is quantified by the QBER measured with detector 1) or I
(2)
Eve to perform the privacy
amplification without compromising the security of the system.
We model the QKD system as follows [11]. The gain of the QKD system is
Q1 = Y0 +GchGBobηD (3)
where Y0 is the background rate, Gch is the channel transmission efficiency, GBob is the
optical transmittance in Bob’s system, and ηD is the efficiency of the SPD. Here we assume
that Y0 ≪ 1 and GchGBobηD ≪ 1. The quantum channel between Alice and Bob is telecom
fiber with attenuation α = 0.21dB/km. The channel efficiency can be estimated by Gch =
10−αL/10, where L is the fiber length in km.
The QBER is determined by
e1 =
e0Y0 + edetGchGBobηD
Q1
(4)
Here e0 = 0.5 is the error rate of background counts, which is dominated by dark counts
[16], and edet is the probability that a single photon hits the wrong detector when Alice and
Bob choose the same basis. edet characterizes the alignment and the stability of the optical
system and the cross-talk between adjacent signals, etc.
We assume that Bob randomly chooses to use one of the following two SPDs: the first
one is fast but noisy (with operating rate r1, efficiency η
(1)
D and dark count probability Y
(1)
0 ),
while the second one is slow but quiet (with operating rate r2, efficiency η
(2)
D and dark count
probability Y
(2)
0 ). To improve the overall efficiency (only the fast SPD contributes to the
final secure key), the probability of choosing the slow SPD should be small (in asymptotic
case, it can approach zero). The secure key rate of the “dual detectors” scheme is given by
R =
1
2
r1Q
(1)
1 [1− f(e
(1)
1 )H2(e
(1)
1 )−H2(e
(2)
1 )]. (5)
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FIG. 1: Simulation results for BB84 protocol with single photon source. Simulation parameters:
α = 0.21dB/km, f(x) = 1.22; GBob = 0.16 and edet = 0.018 [19]; r1 = 1GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.059 and
Y
(1)
0 = 1.3 × 10
−5 [18]; r2 = 2.5MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.5 and Y
(2)
0 = 3 × 10
−7[13]. The key rate of “dual
detectors” system is higher than either of the two single SPD systems up to ∼ 124km. Note that
at a longer distance, when the system with SPD2 alone yields a higher key rate, Bob can simply
use SPD2 itself.
Here, e
(1)
1 and e
(2)
1 are the QBERs measured by SPD1 and SPD2, respectively.
Numerical simulations have been performed based on different combinations of SPDs.
A. Case One: up-conversion SPD and transition-edge sensor SPD
Two different types of SPD are employed in this case. SPD1 is a high speed SPD based
on up-conversion process. Recently, these MHz devices have been employed in GHz rate
QKD systems [17, 18]. SPD2 is a “low noise” SPD based on transition-edge sensors (TESs)
[13, 19]. Simulation parameters are summarized as follows: α = 0.21dB/km, f(x) = 1.22;
GBob = 0.16 and edet = 0.018 [19]; r1 = 1GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.059 and Y
(1)
0 = 1.3 × 10
−5 [18];
r2 = 2.5MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.5 and Y
(2)
0 = 3× 10
−7[13].
Fig.1 shows the simulation results. The key rate of “dual-detector” system is higher than
either of the two single SPD systems up to ∼ 124km. Note that, at a long distance, the
system with SPD2 alone yields a higher key rate than a dual-detector system. Thus Bob
can simply use SPD2 alone.
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FIG. 2: Simulation results for BB84 protocol with single photon source. Simulation parameters:
r1 = 10GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)
0 = 3.2 × 10
−9 and e
(1)
det = 0.097 [21]. Other parameters are same
as in Fig.1. The key rate of “dual detectors” system is significantly higher than either of the two
single SPD systems up to ∼ 200km. Note that no secure key can be produced by SPD1 alone at
any distance.
B. Case Two: low jitter up-conversion SPD and transition-edge sensor SPD
In this case, we assume that SPD1 is a low jitter up-conversion SPD[20], which has
been applied in a 10GHz QKD system [21]. Note that, in this case, due to the high pulse
repetition rate and non-zero time jitter, the cross-talk between adjacent pulses is high. This
contributes to a high QBER independent of fiber length, which is equivalent to a high edet
for SPD1. The parameters for SPD1 are: r1 = 10GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)
0 = 3.2× 10
−9 and
e
(1)
det = 0.097 [21]. Other parameters are the same as in Case One.
Fig.2 shows the simulation results. The key rate of the “dual detectors” system is signifi-
cantly higher than either of the two single SPD systems up to ∼ 200km. Here we particularly
remark that no secure key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any distance.
C. Case Three: two low jitter up-conversion SPDs
In Case One and Case Two, the working principles of the two SPDs are substantially
different. To prevent Eve from exploring the difference between the two detectors, special
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FIG. 3: Simulation results for BB84 protocol with single photon source. Simulation parameters:
r1 = 10GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)
0 = 3.2 × 10
−9 and e
(1)
det = 0.097 [21]; r2 = 100MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.0027,
Y
(2)
0 = 3.2× 10
−9 and e
(2)
det = 0.018; Other parameters are same as in Fig.1. The key rate of “dual
detectors” system is significantly higher than either of the two single SPD systems up to ∼ 190km.
Note that no secure key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any distance.
counter measures, such as narrowband filters, may be required. We will discuss this topic
in details in Section V.
In Case Three, two identical low jitter SPDs are employed to remove the asymmetry
between the two detectors. The probability for choosing SPD1 is close to one. So, it still
suffers from the high QBER due to the cross-talk between adjacent pulses. Since the proba-
bility for choosing SPD2 is quite small (say < 0.01), the cross-talk between adjacent pulses
can be neglected, and the QBER from SPD2 will be much lower. Simulation parameters are
summarized as follows: r1 = 10GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)
0 = 3.2× 10
−9 and e
(1)
det = 0.097 [21].
r2 = 100MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.0027, Y
(2)
0 = 3.2× 10
−9 and e
(2)
det = 0.018. Other parameters are the
same as before.
Fig.3 shows the simulation results. The key rate of the “dual detectors” system is signif-
icantly higher than either of the two single SPD systems up to ∼ 190km. Again, no secure
key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any distance.
In summary, our simulation results demonstrate that the “dual detectors” method can
improve the performance of single photon BB84 QKD system dramatically. We remark that
the same idea can also be applied to QKD with imperfect single photon sources.
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III. DECOY STATE BB84 QKD WITH DUAL DETECTORS
Currently, most of QKD experiments are performed with a weak coherent source. The
photon number of each pulse follows a Poisson distribution with a parameter µ as its expected
photon number, which is set by Alice. In this case, the secure key rate is given by [8]
R =
1
2
r[Q1 − f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ)−Q1H2(e1)]. (6)
Here Qµ, Eµ are the gain and the overall QBER of signal states, while Q1, e1 are the gain
and the QBER of single-photon components. Note that only Qµ, Eµ can be determined
from experimental data directly, while the bounds on Q1 and e1 have to be estimated from
the specific QKD protocol and model of QKD system.
Here, we assume that Alice and Bob perform ideal decoy state BB84 protocol [10, 11].
In the asymptotic case, the estimated value of the above four parameters are given by [11]
Qµ = Y0 + 1− e
−ηµ (7)
Eµ = [e0Y0 + edet(1− e
−ηµ)]/Qµ (8)
Q1 = (Y0 + η)µe
−µ (9)
e1 = (e0Y0 + edetη)µe
−µ/Q1 (10)
Here η = GchGBobηD is the overall efficiency of the QKD system.
The optimal µ for the signal state can be estimated from [11]
(1− µ)e−µ =
f(Eµ)H2(edet)
1−H2(edet)
(11)
With the “dual detectors” method, we expect that Alice and Bob can obtain a tighter
bound on e1, thus lowering the cost of privacy amplification. Simulation parameters are
summarized as follows: α = 0.21dB/km, f(x) = 1.22, µ = 0.73 ; GBob = 0.16 and edet =
0.018 [19]; r1 = 1GHz, η
(1)
D = 0.059 and Y
(1)
0 = 1.3× 10
−5 [18]; r2 = 2.5MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.5 and
Y
(2)
0 = 3 × 10
−7 [13]. The optimal µ in the case of “dual detectors” is chosen based on the
parameters of the fast detector. The simulation results are shown in Fig.4. We see moderate
improvement up to ∼ 82km.
The limited improvement in this protocol can be understood from Eq.(6). The second
term (f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ)) at the right hand side of Eq.(6) is the cost for error correction, while
the third term (Q1H2(e1)) is the cost for privacy amplification. Since f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ) is
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FIG. 4: Simulation results for Decoy state BB84 protocol with weak coherent source: Simulation
parameters: α = 0.21dB/km, f(x) = 1.22, µ = 0.73; GBob = 0.16 and edet = 0.018 [19]; r1 = 1GHz,
η
(1)
D = 0.059 and Y
(1)
0 = 1.3 × 10
−5 [18]; r2 = 2.5MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.5 and Y
(2)
0 = 3× 10
−7[13].The key
rate of “dual detectors” system is higher than either of the two single SPD systems up to ∼ 82km.
Note that even without doing any privacy amplification, the improvement in this case is moderate.
significantly larger than Q1H2(e1), the cost of the error correction term is the dominating
factor. The “dual detectors” system only allows us to reduce the privacy amplification term,
but not the error correction term. Therefore, any improvement due to the “dual detectors”
system for decoy state BB84 protocol over telecom fibers will be moderate. This point is
clearly illustrated by our numerical simulations in Fig.4: even if Alice and Bob did not
perform any privacy amplification, the improvements in secure key rate and secure distance
would still be moderate.
IV. GAUSSIAN-MODULATED COHERENT STATES QKD WITH DUAL DE-
TECTORS
Recently, GMCS QKD has drawn a lot of attention for its potential high secure key rate,
especially at relatively short distance [5, 22, 23, 24, 25]. In this protocol [5], Alice draws two
random numbers XA and PA from a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance VA
(in shot-noise units), and sends a coherent state |XA+iPA〉 to Bob. Bob randomly chooses to
measure either the phase quadrature or the amplitude quadrature with a phase modulator
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and a homodyne detector. During the classical communication stage, Bob informs Alice
which quadrature he measures for each pulse and Alice will drop the other one. Eventually,
they can work out a set of correlated Gaussian variables, which will be converted to a secure
key. It has been shown in [5] that with “reverse reconciliation” (RR) protocol [23], this
scheme can tolerate high channel loss on the condition that the excess noise (the noise
above vacuum noise) is not too high, while with “direct reconciliation” (DR) protocol [22],
this scheme can yield a high key rate at relatively short distances.
A. Direct Reconciliation Protocol
We assume symmetry on the noise characteristics between the amplitude quadrature
measurement and phase quadrature measurement. For additive Gaussian noise channels,
the mutual information between Alice and Bob, IAB, and between Alice and Eve, IAE, are
given by [22]
IAB = (1/2) log2[(V + χ)/(1 + χ)] (12)
IAE = (1/2) log2[(V + 1/χ)/(1 + 1/χ)] (13)
where V = VA+1 is the variance of Alice’s field quadratures in shot-noise units, χ = χvac+ε
is the equivalent input noise, where χvac = (1−G)/G is the “vacuum noise” associated with
the overall transmission efficiency G, while ε is the “excess noise”. G = GchGdet, where Gch
is the channel efficiency and Gdet is the detection efficiency.
Note that since ε is the “excess noise” with respect to the input, it can be described by
ε = εpre+εdet/G, where εpre and εdet are the “excess noises” associated with imperfections in
state preparation and homodyne detection, respectively. Obviously, at long distances (i.e.,
G is small), the main contribution to ε is from the detector noise.
The security key rate of a DR protocol is given by [22]
R1 = r(βIAB − IAE) (14)
where r is the repetition rate of the QKD system and β ∈ (0, 1) is the efficiency of DR
protocol.
In GMCS QKD system, the “excess noise” plays a similar role as the dark count proba-
bility of SPD in BB84 protocol. The “dual detectors” scheme can be employed to improve
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FIG. 5: Simulation results for GMCS QKD with DR protocol. Simulation parameters: α =
0.21dB/km, V = 40, β = 1; Gdet = 0.8, εpre = 0.05[24]; r1 = 82MHz, εdet1 = 0.43 [26]; r2 = 1MHz,
εdet2 = 0.01[24]. With the “dual-detectors” method, we see a significant improvement of the key
rate (more than one order of magnitude) at relatively short distance(up to 5km).
the performance of a GMCS QKD system based on realistic homodyne detectors, as in the
case of BB84 protocol. Specifically, at the classical communication stage, Alice and Bob
use the measurement results from the quiet detector and Eq.(13) to estimate IAE and the
measurement results from the fast detector and Eq.(12) to calculate IAB. Using Eqs.(12-14),
the secure key rate of the “dual detectors” scheme can be derived as
R2 = r1{(β/2) log2[(V + χvac + ε1)/(1 + χvac + ε1)]
−(1/2) log2[(V + 1/(χvac + ε2))/(1 + 1/(χvac + ε2))]} (15)
Simulation parameters are summarized as follows: α = 0.21dB/km, V = 40, β = 1,
Gdet = 0.80; εpre = 0.05[24]; r1 = 82MHz, εdet1 = 0.43 [26]; r2 = 1MHz, εdet2 = 0.01[24].
Fig.5 shows the simulation results. With the “dual detectors” method, we see a significant
improvement of the key rate (more than one order) at relatively short distance (up to 5km).
B. Reverse Reconciliation Protocol
In RR protocols, Bob sends classical information to Alice, who in turn modifies her initial
data to match with Bob’s measurement results. The security key rate of a RR protocol is
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given by [5, 24]
R1 = r(βIBA − IBE) (16)
where the mutual information between Bob and Alice, IBA, and between Bob and Eve, IBE ,
are given by [5]
IBA = (1/2) log2[(V + χ)/(1 + χ)] (17)
IBE = (1/2) log2[G
2(V + χ)(V −1 + χ)] (18)
We remark that to derive the above equations, Eve is allowed to control both the efficiency
and excess noise in Bob’s system. In contrast, in [5, 24], the authors took a “realistic”
approach by assuming that the noises associated with Bob’s system do not contribute to
Eve’s information.
We remark that there is a substantial difference between GMCS QKD with DR pro-
tocol and GMCS QKD with RR protocol. In DR protocol, Alice/Bob try to bound the
mutual information between Alice and Eve I
(0)
AE, which is independent on the performance
of Bob’s measurement device. Due to the noise and loss presented in Bob’s system, they
will overestimate I
(0)
AE as I
(1)
AE (with detector1) or I
(2)
AE (with detector2). Obviously, they can
use min{I
(1)
AE, I
(2)
AE} as an estimation of I
(0)
AE in Eq.(14). In “reverse reconciliation” method,
the above argument cannot be applied. In this case, Alice/Bob try to bound the mutual
information between Bob and Eve IBE , which depends on both the efficiency and the noise
of the homodyne detector (see Eq.(18), where the overall transmission efficiency G contains
contribution from the efficiency of the homodyne detector ). If the efficiencies of the two
detectors are different, Eve’s information on Bob’s measurement results acquired with de-
tector1 may be different from her information on Bob’s measurement results acquired with
detector2. In order to use the slow detector to give a better bound on IBE for the data
acquired with the fast detector, we have to assume that both detectors have the same ef-
ficiency. Note that this is a reasonable assumption in practice, since the efficiency of the
homodyne detector is mainly determined by two factors—the optical coupling efficiency and
the quantum efficiency of the photo diode. Both factors are insensitive to the operation rate.
We remark that transmission loss plays different roles in different QKD protocols. In
GMCS QKD, the transmission loss will introduce “vacuum noise” to Bob’s measurement
results, and Bob cannot distinguish this “vacuum noise” from the “excess noise” contributed
13
by the homodyne detector or other imperfections in the QKD system. To bound Eve’s in-
formation on Bob’s measurement results, Alice and Bob have to estimate both the efficiency
of the QKD system and the “excess noise”. On the other hand, in BB84 QKD, since Al-
ice/Bob post-select the cases when Bob has detections (they drop all the other cases), the
transmission loss only lower the efficiency but not contribute to the QBER. To bound Eve’s
information, Alice/Bob only need to estimate the QBER. This may explain why in BB84
QKD, to apply the “dual detectors” idea, it is no necessary to make assumptions on the
efficiencies of the two detectors.
The secure key rate of the “dual detectors” scheme can be derived as
R2 = r1{(β/2) log2[(V + χvac + ε1)/(1 + χvac + ε1)]
−(1/2) log2[G
2(V + χvac + ε2)(V
−1 + χvac + ε2)]} (19)
Simulation parameters are the same as in DR protocol. Fig.6 shows the simulation results.
With the “dual detectors” method, we see a significant improvement of the key rate (more
than one order of magnitude) at relatively short distance (up to 17km). Note that, in this
case, no positive key rate can be achieved with detector1 alone at any distance.
In practice, for a finite key length, the reconciliation algorithm is not perfect. Fig.7 shows
the simulation results with a realistic RR protocol (V = 20, β = 0.8, other parameters are
the same as in Fig.6). With the “dual detectors” method, we see a significant improvement
of the key rate (more than one order of magnitude) at relatively short distance (up to 5km).
Again, no positive key rate can be achieved with detector1 alone at any distance.
We remark that the above security analysis about GMCS QKD, which are cited from
[5], may be applicable to individual attacks only. The security of GMCS protocol under the
most general attack is still under investigation [27].
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES
In this section, we will discuss several practical issues in implementing the “dual detector”
idea, including the loss introduced by the optical switch, the probability of using each type
of detectors, the chromatic dispersion of long fiber and the security of a practical setup.
In previous sections, we assume that Bob has an ideal, lossless optical switch to distribute
the incoming pulses between the two detectors. A commercial high speed optical switch
14
FIG. 6: Simulation results for GMCS QKD with RR protocol. Simulation parameters: α =
0.21dB/km, V = 40, β = 1; Gdet = 0.8, εpre = 0.05[24]; r1 = 82MHz, εdet1 = 0.43 [26]; r2 = 1MHz,
εdet2 = 0.01[24]. With the “dual-detectors” method, we see a significant improvement of the key
rate (more than one order of magnitude) at relatively short distance(up to 17km). Note that in
this case, no positive key rate can be achieved with detector1 alone at any distance.
FIG. 7: Simulation results for GMCS QKD with realistic RR protocol. Simulation parameters:
α = 0.21dB/km, V = 20, β = 0.8; Gdet = 0.8, εpre = 0.05[24]; r1 = 82MHz, εdet1 = 0.43 [26];
r2 = 1MHz, εdet2 = 0.01[24]. With the “dual-detectors” method, we see a significant improvement
of the key rate (more than one order of magnitude) at relatively short distance(up to 5km). Note
that in this case, no positive key rate can be achieved with detector1 alone at any distance.
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FIG. 8: Simulation results with a lossy (3dB) optical switch. Simulation parameters: r1 = 10GHz,
η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)
0 = 3.2 × 10
−9 and e
(1)
det = 0.097 [21]. Other parameters are same as in Fig.1.
The key rate of “dual detectors” system is significantly higher than either of the two single SPD
systems up to ∼ 180km. Note that no secure key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any distance.
designed for telecom industry has a insertion loss around 3dB. To make a fair comparison,
we introduce an additional 3dB loss in Bob’s system for “dual detector” scheme. The
simulation results demonstrate that in the case of single photon QKD, the advantage of
“dual detector” is still obvious, as shown in Fig.8 and Fig.9, while in the case of decoy state
QKD and GMCS QKD, the additional 3dB loss is disastrous: with the parameters used in
Sections 3 and 4, the “dual detector” scheme shows no advantage over conventional “single
detector” scheme. This result is not surprising: for decoy-state QKD, even with a perfect
lossless switch, the improvement is quite limited (see Fig.4); for GMCS QKD, we already
know that the key rate drops sharply as the channel loss increase [5].
We remark that the 3dB loss of a commercial high speed optical switch is mostly due
to the fiber-waveguide coupling loss, which is by no means a hard limit imposed by the
technology. In fact, if only one wavelength channel is used for QKD, one could optimize
waveguide design to minimize coupling loss. In this case, one can reasonably expect the
insertion loss to be much lower than 1dB, at a higher price.
Another important issue is how to determine the probability of using each of the two
detectors. Since only the output from the fast detector contributes to the final key, in
asymptotic limit, the probability of using the slow detector should be as small as possible.
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FIG. 9: Simulation results with a lossy (3dB) optical switch. Simulation parameters: r1 = 10GHz,
η
(1)
D = 0.0027, Y
(1)
0 = 3.2 × 10
−9 and e
(1)
det = 0.097 [21]; r2 = 100MHz, η
(2)
D = 0.0027, Y
(2)
0 =
3.2 × 10−9 and e
(2)
det = 0.018; Other parameters are same as in Fig.1. The key rate of “dual
detectors” system is significantly higher than either of the two single SPD systems up to ∼ 175km.
Note that no secure key can be produced by SPD1 alone at any distance.
In practice, two other factors have to be taken into account. First, in order to estimate
the system parameters accurately, Alice/Bob have to acquire enough data for either type of
detectors in a reasonable time period. This determines the lower bound on the probability for
choosing the slow detector. Second, the slow detector may have a large time jitter. If more
than one pulses are sent to it within its response window, Bob cannot tell which incoming
pulse the detection event corresponds to and the QBER will increase. This determines
the upper bound on the probability of choosing the slow detector. In the following, we will
estimate the probability p of choosing the slow detector (detector2) based on the parameters
of a practical setup.
We assume the period of the signal pulse is Tsig, and the time resolution (time jitter) of
detector2 is Tdet. In each single response window of detector2, there are k (= Tdet/Tsig) pulses
sent out by Alice. Bob randomly chooses to use either detector1 (with a probability of 1−p)
or detector2 (with a probability of p) to measure the input pulse. In each Tdet time window,
the probabilities that Bob does not choose detector2, chooses it one time, or chooses it more
than one time are P0 (= (1−p)
k), P1 (= kp(1−p)
k−1) and PM (= 1−P0−P1), respectively.
Assuming that p≪ k ≪ 1, we have P1 = kp−k(k−1)p
2 and PM = k(k−1)p
2/2. Note that
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the probability that Bob chooses detector2 only one time (in the Tdet time window)and he
does detect a signal is Psig = µηP1, where µ is the average photon number per pulse, and η is
the overall transmission efficiency (including the channel efficiency, the optical transmittance
in Bob’s system, and the efficiency of detector2). This is an effective detection. On the other
hand, if Bob chooses detector2 more than one time and he does detect a signal, then he has
to randomly assign this detection event to one of the input pulses he chooses. If we assume
that the major contribution to PM comes from P2, then the probability for Bob to get a
“messed detection” is Perr = 2µηPM , where the factor 2 takes into account that two pulses
have been sent to detector2. The error rate of these “messed detection” is 1/4, because half
of the time, Bob will assign the detection event to the right pulse (no error), the other half
of time, Bob will assign the detection event to the wrong pulse (1/2 error). The overall
QBER due to the “multi-pulses” problem can be estimated as
QBER ≈
Perr
4(Perr + Psig)
≈
1
4
(k − 1)p (20)
Using parameters in Fig.1, Tdet = 100ns [13], Tsig = 1ns (1GHz pulse repetition rate),
we have k = 100. To make the additional QBER < 1%, we get p < 4 × 10−4. On the
other hand, if we assume the channel loss is 21dB (100km fiber), GBob = 0.16, η
(2)
D = 0.5,
the additional loss due to optical switch is 3dB, then, with p = 4 × 10−4 and 1GHz pulse
repetition rate, Bob will have ∼ 106 counts in about 2 hours, which is large enough to
estimate various parameters of the QKD system [28]. In Fig.3, since both detectors have
small time jitter, the p value can be relatively large.
We remark that the minimum p achievable in practice is limited by the extinction ratio
of the optical switch. On the other hand, it may be possible to overcome this “multi pulses”
problem by improving the protocol. For example, Bob can prepare his random pattern for
the optical switch in the following way: if the nth pulse is assigned to the slow detector, then
the next r pulses (r is determined by the time resolution of the slow detector) will not be
assigned to it. This is equivalent to introducing a “virtual dead time” to the slow detector.
It is interesting to investigate the security of this scheme. However, we do not have a definite
answer so far.
We remark that the slow response of detector2 also prevents Bob from using a passive
beam splitter to replace the optical switch. In that case, Bob cannot tell which input pulse
corresponds to the detection event from detetor2.
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The third practical issue is the chromatic dispersion introduced by the telecom fiber.
The chromatic dispersion of conventional telecom fiber at 1550nm is around 18ps/nm · km.
In many QKD system, the spectral width of the laser pulse is in the order of 0.1nm, so
the temporal pulse width will be extended by 180ps after it goes through 100km fiber.
This will cause severe cross talks between adjacent pulses when the system is operated
at 10GHz. We remark that dispersion compensation (DC) is an important issue even in
classical communication, and various successful DC techniques have been developed. For
example, in [29], after going through a 50km fiber, a 460fs pulse was only slightly broadened
to 470fs. Similar techniques can also be applied to a QKD system. We remark that the loss
introduced by DC components will not compromise the performance of the QKD system,
since it can be deployed inside Alice’s system.
An important assumption of our “dual detector” idea is that a signal from Eve cannot
fool the two detectors by behaving differently. Such an assumption must not be taken for
granted. Instead, it should be examined carefully in any practical system. However, we
note that there are various defense strategies that Alice and Bob can employ to make our
assumption more realistic. For instance, to prevent Eve from attacking the two detectors
differently by sending laser pulses at different wavelengths, Bob has to make sure that the
spectral responses of the two detectors are identical to Eve. Normally, a photon detector has
a spectral response range from tens of nm to larger than 100nm, while the spectral width of
the laser pulse from Alice is less than 1nm. By placing a narrowband optical filter (with a
bandwidth of∼ 1nm) at the entrance of Bob’s system, we can safely assume that the spectral
responses of both detectors are flat in this spectral window [30]. On the other hand, Eve
may explore the different temporal responses of the two detectors by shifting the arriving
time of the laser pulse [31]. For example, in the case of up-conversion SPD, to achieve a low
dark count, Bob uses narrow time windows, which are centered around the incoming pulses,
to post-select effective detection events. All detection events outside these time windows
will be dropped. If the widths of time windows are different for the two detectors, Eve may
time-shift a pulse in such a way that one detector will treat it as an effective event, while
the other one will drop it. We remark that to prevent Eve from launching such a time-shift
attack, Bob should monitor the time distribution of all his detection events.
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VI. DISCUSSION
The performance of a QKD system in telecom wavelength is mainly determined by the
performance of its detection system. To achieve high speed, long distance QKD, fast and
quiet detectors are on demand. Unfortunately, in practice, a fast detector is usually more
noisy than a slow one. Here, we propose a “dual detectors” scheme to improve the perfor-
mance of a practical QKD system with realistic detectors. Our simulation results demon-
strate significant improvements of the secure key rate in some QKD protocols.
Any security proof of a practical QKD system is built on its underlying assumptions: what
kinds of imperfections exist, what Eve can control/know about Alice’s and Bob’s systems.
Obviously, if we allow Eve to control/know everything (like which SPD clicks in BB84
QKD), secure QKD is hopeless. On the other hand, people normally assume that the loss
inside Bob’s system and the dark count of Bob’s SPD are under Eve’s control. In this case,
secure QKD is still possible. Unfortunately, in practice, there are no clear rules to determine
what assumptions should be chosen. Some assumptions may enforce the security of a QKD
system without comprising its efficiency, while others may damage its efficiency greatly
without contributing much to its security. It is important to inspect all those underlying
assumptions behind a practical QKD system carefully. It will be very interesting to test
experimentally our assumption—that a signal cannot fool the two detectors by behaving
differently—in a practical QKD system. Such a test will lead to a better understanding and
potential refinements of our assumption.
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